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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
No. 41589-13 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC; 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
V. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC and FORREST PRESTON; 
Defendants/ Appellants 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock. 
Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge, presiding. 
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I. ARGlJMENT 
A. Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to this case. 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Pocatello Medical Centers, LLC (PMC) sued Quail Ridge 
Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) for breach of contract in Pl'vfC I. (R Vol. I, pp. 218-50.) 
the majority of the time P MC I was pending it was strictly a breach of contract claim for the 
2010 rent adjustment period. A few weeks before trial, PMC amended its complaint to allege a 
declaratory action. (!d., pp. 255-63.) PMC never argued before the district court at the time 
that the breach of contract for the 10 rent adjustment period was unripe or 
otherwise incapable of being adjudicated at trial during PMC I. If the breach claim was subject to 
any ripeness exception to res judicata, PMC should have raised it before the district court in 
Plv!C I. The Court, however, should not be distracted: the breach of contract claim was alleged 
all of the way through trial and when it was dismissed it was done so on the basis that there was 
no evidence of a breach for the 2010 rent adjustment period. 
The Court does not need to involve itself in analyzing comments made in the 
Restatements (Second) Judgments to find that res judicata should have been applied by the 
district court as a bar to the present case. In Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943 
(Idaho 20 12), the Court identified the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel. !d. at 951. 
As discussed in the Appellant Brief, the elements identified in Berkshire Investments exist in this 
case and should apply to the dismissal of the breach of contract claim. 
PMC argues, based on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, that there is an exception 
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to on . at 1 
Section 
on of action or the 
plaintiff's failure to satisfy a precondition to suit" in order for the exception to apply. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JuDGMENTS§ 20(2) (1982). PMC then argues that the dismissal of the 
breach of contract claim was based on the fact that is was premature. (Respondent Br. at 17.) 
PMC's argument is unfair representation of what actually occurred in PMC I PMC does not cite 
the record in its of what happened when the claim was dismissed by Judge Brown. 
(/d. at 16-20.) PMC is left solely with legal rhetoric that has no basis in the facts from PMC I and 
the as articulated to the district court in this case. Ripeness was simply not an issue for the 
dismissal of the breach of contract claim in P MC I, nor was it raised as a justification for 
dismissing the claim during those proceedings. (R Vol. I, p. 270.) 
In P MC I, PMC had a full and fair opportunity to present the entirety of its case against 
Quail Ridge. After PMC presented its evidence, Quail Ridge moved for directed verdict. (!d.) 
PMC did not move to voluntarily dismiss nor did PMC argue that the claim should have been 
dismissed without prejudice or a specific reservation of the breach of contract claim for a 
subsequent proceeding. (!d.) PMC's attorney, instead, stipulated to the dismissal without ever 
referring to the doctrine of ripeness or prematurity of the breach of contract claim. (!d.) PMC's 
counsel's statements in response to the Quail Ridge motion were: 
MR. HAWKINS: I can probably stipulate on this and save a little time. I agree exactly 
with what Mr. Gatiney is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the trial. We feel that 
the way we have alleged the complaint, and especially with the amendment for the 
declaratory judgment, which effectively becomes the adjustment process that we're 
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(!d., p. ) was no evidence "that in [itsJ mind 
would have supported a breach of contract claim associated with this matter." (!d.) Though 
PMC's counsel said that he was withdrawing the breach of contract claim, the consequence of 
PMC's !~1ilurc to present evidence supporting the claim was a dismissal on directed verdict by 
the district court. (ld., p. 270.) P MC I did not involve a voluntary dismissal or the failure of a 
precondition to breach of contract claim. P MC I constituted a complete dismissal a claim 
following trial, with a tull and fair opportunity for the plaintitito present its evidence to a district 
court of competent jurisdiction. As noted in prior briefing, Judge Brown expressly found that 
PMC presented no evidence that Quail Ridge had breached the terms of the Ground Lease 
Agreement and that there were no facts justifYing the entry of a money judgment in PMC's 
favor. (!d., pp. 273-77.) 
Quail Ridge's position is entirely consistent with the Restatement (Second) Judgments 
Section20(2). When an action is brought for a specific claim, i.e., breach of contract for the 2010 
rent adjustment period in this case, and that claim is litigated fully through trial, and the elements 
of res judicata exist, then res judicata/collateral estoppel bars subsequent litigation if for no other 
reason than judicial economy. 
Here, PMC alleged in its Amended Complaint that Quail Ridge owed adjusted rent in the 
amount of$416,812.50. (!d., p. 262.) PMC alleged that it gave notice ofthe adjusted rent to 
Quail Ridge. (!d., p. 259.) PMC alleged that the adjusted rent was done properly based on the 
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an 
to Quail had 
1'-'""'""·u.the contract as to 2010 rent (/d., pp. The illustration 
found in Restatement (Second) Judgments Section 20, Comment I is not analogous to this case. 
That particular illustration contemplates a lawsuit where the time for performance had not 
arrived. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS§ 20, cmt. 1. At the time of dismissal in PMC I, 
PMC did not claim that date for performance of Quail Ridge's contractual obligations was 
yet to arrive. Throughout the course PMC I, PMC argued the opposite, i.e., money was due 
owing from Quail Quail Ridge simply PMC failed to present evidence at 
supporting a breach of contract claim and the district court agreed. (!d., p. 270.) Thus the 
original action, P MC I, ended in a final judgment on the merits of the breach of contract claim 
for the 2010 rent adjustment period in favor of Quail Ridge. Berkshire Jnvs., LLC, 278 P.3d at 
951. 
This case involves the same parties and the present case arises out of the same transaction 
or series of transactions as the original complaint. Id. PMC's argument that the dismissal was 
based on prematurity of the claim is simply untrue. Section 20 Comment k even requires that a 
court determine that the plaintiff "has no enforceable claim because the action is premature" 
before Section 20 even applies. The district court never made such a determination in P MC I 
when it granted the directed verdict motion. (Jd.) Judge Brown's commentary in the Order on 
Form of Judgment has no bearing on the basis for the dismissal of the claim on directed verdict 
because it is dicta. The Court's focus should be on the manner in which the breach of contract 
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breach of contract 
a full to do so. ISSUe by 
PMC"s counsel before Judge Brown in PMC f. 
Judge Naftz's statement that the claim was "ripe for summary judgment" failed to 
appreciate the fact that there had been a full and fair opportunity for PMC to litigate its claim in 
the prior action. (Tr. Hr'g 46:7-47:6, October 21, 2013). Judge Naftz's commented solely on the 
lawsuit him and not on the ripeness of the breach of contract claim in PA1C I. Therefore, 
as set in the Appellant Brief~ the district court erred by granting summary judgment to PMC 
and denying the cross-motion asserting res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
B. There were no changes in circumstances giving rise to a new claim for the 2010 
rent adjustment period. 
After the conclusion of PMC I, no new set of facts arose that gave rise to the second case. 
The fundamental premise of this matter is the same as the premise that existed in PMC I. Both 
cases relate to the payment of adjusted rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period. Both cases are 
for breach of contract. In PMC I, PMC alleged that it had adjusted the rent and that the adjusted 
rent, after offsets, was $416,812.50. (Id., pp. 255-63.) Quail Ridge disputed the amount owed in 
that action; hence, the parties tried the case to Judge Brown in May 2012. 
PMC can only cite one new fact in support of its argument that the breach of contract 
claim was not ripe for adjudication in P MC I. The sole new fact relied upon by the hospital is the 
outcome of Pi\1C I. However, as noted supra, the facts underlying P MC I are the same as the 
facts in this case. They are not new. The Restatement (Second) Judgments Section 24, Comment 





The Restatement provides the following examples of changes in circumstances: 
I 0. A brings an action against B to set aside a transfer of land on the ground that it was 
procured by fraud. A tails to prove the fraud and judgment is given for the defendant. A 
is not precluded from maintaining an action to recover the land on the ground that since 
judgment was rendered B has forfeited the land to the plaintiff for breach of a condition 
in the conveyance. 
11. A judgment of divorce awards custody of a minor child of the marriage to the wife 
after a contest over her suitability as a mother. Upon a later demonstration by the 
husband, on the basis of subsequent experience, that the wife is in fact unsuitable, 
custody may be awarded to the husband. 
12. The government tails in an action against a defendant under an antitrust statute for 
lack of adequate proof that the defendant participated in a conspiracy to restrain trade. 
The government is not precluded from a second action against the same defendant in 
which it relies on conspiratorial acts post-dating the judgment in the first action, and may 
rely also on acts preceding the judgment insofar as these lend significance to the later 
acts. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 24, cmt. f. None of the foregoing illustrations are 
useful in this case except to demonstrate how inapt the change in circumstances is in this case. 
Each ofthe examples utilizes discrete, post-suit events that give rise to the second action. The 
first example is based on an entirely different legal theory predicated on facts that did not exist 
during the first suit. Illustration 11 is a family law case where subsequent events give rise to 
petitions to modifY custody or other provisions of the decree. It is not useful here. Illustration 12 
is based on a separate conspiratorial act after the judgment creating a new infraction of the law. 
Without belaboring the point, Judge Brown heard all of the evidence related to the claim 
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0 rent 
not 
supporting of contract The 
district court did not attach a "without prejudice" to the dismissal of the claim. PMC did not 
voluntarily withdraw the claim because it was unripe. This was a situation where PMC did not 
present evidence in support of the claim and it was dismissed by the district court. (!d., p. 270.) 
All this was briefed and argued to the district court. 
PMC brought claim tor breach of contract against Quail Ridge in P MC I. In presenting 
its of contract claim Quail Ridge prior to dismissal of 
the breach claim, PMC offered the matter of its claim for breach of contract by Quail Ridge to 
the district court. PMC's procedural strategy, as admitted by its attorney during PMC I, has 
consequences. (SeeR Vol. I, pp. 270.) Res judicata applies and this case is barred. 
C. Adopting Section 26(1 )(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments has no 
impact on this case. 
PMC asks the Court to make new law in Idaho formally adopting Section 26(1)(b) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. There is no need for the Court to adopt the section as the 
law. The Court should only decide the issues before it and not unnecessarily create new law. 
Adoption of this section is unnecessary because Judge Brown never expressly reserved PMC's 
right to sue in the second action. 
As noted previously, at trial Judge Brown clearly stated that he did not see any evidence 
supporting the breach of contract claim for both the 2007 & 2010 rent adjustment periods. (!d.) 
He dismissed those claims. (Id.) At the time of dismissal, Judge Brown did not expressly reserve 
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to at a comments 
arc They are not 
contract claim. Instead, when those comments about 
failure to pay this amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach 
of contract" were made in the context of deciding whether he could enter a traditional money 
judgment that would be enforceable by PMC. 1 
Comment b to Section 26 states, in part: 
reservation by the court (Subsection (l)(b)). It may appear in the course of an 
action that the plaintiff is splitting a claim, but that there are special reasons that justif)r 
his doing so, and accordingly that the judgment in the action ought not to have the usual 
consequences of extinguishing the entire claim; rather the plaintiff should be left with an 
opportunity to litigate in a second action that part of the claim which he justifiably 
omitted from the first action. A determination by the court that its judgment is "without 
prejudice" (or words to that effect) to a second action on the omitted part of the claim, 
expressed in the judgment itself, or in the findings of fact, conclusions of law, opinion, or 
similar record, unless reversed or set aside, should ordinarily be given effect in the 
second action. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26. Here, there was no determination by the district 
court in P MC I that is consistent with Comment b. There was no ruling that PMC would be left 
"with an opportunity to litigate in a second action that part of the claim which he justifiably 
omitted from the first action." !d. In short, the section does not apply. 
1 Though it's not in the record, PMC submitted a traditional money judgment after Judge Brown issued his Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in PMC I. Quail Ridge objected on the basis that because the breach of contract 
claim had been dismissed that PMC was not entitled to a Money Judgment. Consequently, Judge Brown had to 
decide what form the judgment should take in the context of a declaratory relief action. His comments in no way 
constitute an express reservation of a breach of contract claim in conjunction with the dismissal of the claim on 
directed verdict. 
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D. Preston is not a proper party to the action. 
to matter IS 
upon a new set of to the cause of PMC no 
naming him as a party to this action even though it had sued fbr breach of contract during PMC I. 
Preston incorporates by reference all arguments set forth in Sections A through B in this Reply 
Brief and in the Appellant Brief as being responsive to the issues raised by PMC as to whether he 
is a proper party. 
E. The district court erred in awarding attorney fees. 
district court should not have awarded fees under Section 1 121 res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are legitimate legal defenses to the breach of contract claims. 
Even assuming that the district court was correct in denying the cross-motion for summary 
judgment and rejecting the legal defenses, there was a valid dispute whether the breach of 
contract claim was barred by res judicata because PMC sued for breach of the 2010 rent 
adjustment period. This Court has routinely denied fees under 12-121 to prevailing parties in 
cases far more dubious that Quail Ridge's assertion of the res judicata defense. Clearwater REI, 
LLC v. Boling, 155 Idaho 954, 318 P.3d 944, 952 (2014). The proceedings below and this appeal 
constitute a genuine dispute of law and a reasonable request for the Court to clarify the law 
related to res judicata and collateral estoppeL It was not unreasonable for Quail Ridge to defend 
the lawsuit on the basis that it did. Consequently, the Court should vacate the attorney fee award 
based on Section 12-121. 
Attorney fees in Idaho are to be reasonable. Reasonableness is the byword of attorney fee 
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courts 
A s to m of identified in 
demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion. 
Quail Ridge does not assert that a district comt has to identify and explain how each 
factor applies to a case. The Court has ruled that those facts do not alone establish an abuse 
of discretion. frYl•in "'"""''" Agency, Inc. v. lvlurphy, 122 Idaho 270, 833 P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 
1992). However, '"In determining amount of a 'reasonable attorney fee' court is required 
to consider the at LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)." !d. There 
is no evidence in the record indicating that the district court even considered the existence and 
applicability of 54(e)(3). (R Vol. I, pp. 413-19.) Reasonableness may be the overarching 
principle of attorney fee awards but district comts are not empowered to fix those awards 
without recognizing and considering the factors outlined in Rule 54(e)(3). PMC only argues that 
the district court considered the disputed entries and took them into accmmt in fixing the award. 
Unfortunately, that is not what is required by Rule 54(e)(3) or the case law. The district court 
must actually considered the Rule 54(e)(3) factors in order for any award to be reasonable. The 
district court did not do so in this case and therefore the award should be vacated. 
PMC cites no authority for its argument that the discretionary costs were awardable in 
this case. It never made a showing to the district court how the costs for legal research were 
exceptional in this case. It is true that Quail Ridge cited In re Beach to the district court during 
the proceedings below. The district court ignored that authority; however, the point made in 
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are costs a a 
11 WL 4963003, *8 . D. Idaho October 19, 2011 ). 
IS costs and is nothing in the record 
substantiating PMC's conclusory statement in footnote 8 that "it is not an uncommon practice for 
smaller law firms in rural communties, like Pocatello, Idaho, to pass part of this costs (sic) onto 
their clients." (Respondent Br. at 34, n. 8.) Whether law firms pass on the costs to clients is 
to the determination whether the research costs are exceptional costs that are 
awardable under Rule 54( d). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding the 
research costs to PMC. 
II. CONCLUSION 
In P MC I, PMC sued Quail Ridge for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment 
period. PMC had no evidence of breach and fully litigated the claim against Quail Ridge. The 
district court dismissed the breach of contract claim without reference to whether the claim was 
ripe or carving out the breach claim for a subsequent lawsuit. Without qualifYing the dismissal as 
a dismissal "without prejudice" the dismissal was with prejudice and constituted a full 
adjudication of the breach of contract claim. This lawsuit should have been barred by res judicata 
and collateral estoppeL Therefore, the district court erred by granting PMC's summary judgment 
and denying the cross-motion for summary judgment submitted by Quail Ridge and Preston. 
The district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to PMC. Quail Ridge is 
entitled to have the Court both vacate the basis for the attorney fee award to the extent it relies on 
Idaho Code Section 12-121. Quail Ridge is also entitled to have the Court vacate the award 
Appellant Reply Brief 13 
it court ) 
it was cost 
By court on case, PMC will cease 
overall prevailing party in the action and therefore not entitled to attorney fees under Section 1 
120(3) or Section 10.3 of the Ground Lease Agreement. Instead, Quail Ridge will be entitled to 
its attorney fees during the proceedings below and on appeal, as set forth in the Appellant Brief. 
Dated: July 15,2014 
vondet 
St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys tor the Defendants/ Appellants 
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